This is the seventh post in the Historicizing Adaptation blog series, introduced here by series editor Shannon Stunden Bower.
In January 2021, the Canadian government established the Crown Indigenous Working Group (CIWG) to review the management and potential release of oil sands tailings into the Athabasca River. In their review, the CIWG, which includes representatives from the provincial and federal government, industry, and nine upstream Indigenous communities, is committed to protecting both “the environment” and “human health,” while also considering the learnings from United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC).1
Although the Working Group has been meeting for more than four years, and has produced thousands of pages of “technical” reports,2 some downstream communities remain distrustful of the idea that tailings can be safely released back into the Athabasca River.3 For many, nearly 60 years of modern industrial development and tailings releases into the Athabasca River have fundamentally reshaped their understanding of the river. This blog post will explore some of the historical events that transformed downstream communities’ understandings of the river, providing clues as to why solutions for managing tailings that do not address the past will most likely fail.
Adapting a Knowledge System to Experience: Indigenous Knowledge of “Dangerous” Athabasca River Water
The relationship that Indigenous peoples built with the Athabasca River over generations was shaken in the years immediately following the opening of the Great Canadian Oil Sands [GCOS] project in 1967.4 In a letter to the Alberta government from that year, Theresa Grandjambe, writing on behalf the Fort McKay Community Association, explained that “the people of Fort McKay have a complaint on the water, they claim the water is not healthy to drink which is very true, the water is no good to drink because the Bechtel Company5 empties their lagoon which is not very healthy for the water for us people to drink.”6 The concern was investigated and largely dismissed by Alberta government officer L. Gareau. His report concluded that, regardless of the claim’s validity (which he did not check), the Fort McKay community “consisting of 40 families with mostly unemployed bread winners” could – and should– arrange to “haul in a little bit of drinking water half a mile” from the muskeg-fed McKay River to avoid potential contamination caused by oil sands development on the Athabasca River.7
This first interaction with the Alberta government regarding “not very healthy water” was undoubtably jarring for a community that had lived and depended on the Athabasca River for generations.8 Probably for the first time in their lives, Fort McKay residents had to question their trust of the Athabasca River. Further, their treatment by Mr. Gareau seemingly confirmed that their concerns were not taken seriously by the Alberta government or the surrounding industrial developers. Such interactions have the power to reset relationships and they forced downstream Indigenous peoples to adapt their long-held understandings that the Athabasca River was the giver of life.
The concerns raised by Grandjambe continued to preoccupy many in the community. Ultimately, they more or less stopped using the Athabasca River as their regular water source. Without the Athabasca River, and likely following Gareau’s recommendation, community members mainly obtained their drinking water from “small, contaminated muskeg overflows” (including the McKay River) near Fort McKay. This caused community members to experience “gastroenteritis,” with those in “the first decade of life” being most affected. The local health officer noted in 1973 that since 1967, multiple deaths had occurred in Fort McKay “ascribable to diarrhoea of dysenteric origin,” undoubtably causing more confusion and fear about the water.9 In the mid-1970s, temporary water towers were constructed to provide access to clean water, though these were prone to failure, forcing community members to regularly get water from other locations. These other locations included the Athabasca River, despite the fact that it was periodically subject to oil and tailings spills.10
Through the 1970s, downstream Indigenous communities learned to live with an increasingly polluted river. Major oil and tailings spills occurred in 1970, 1974 and in 1976.11 In the process of investigating the 1976 spill, the federal government acknowledged that they had known for more than a year that GCOS was dumping 400,000 gallons a day of waste from their tailings pond into the Athabasca, though this information was not initially shared with downstream communities.12 While media and governmental opposition attempted to force meaningful action and justice, government and industry, by and large, dismissed such attempts as “panic” concocted to challenge the economic viability of the Great Canadian Oil Sand’s project.13 Facing unprecedented change driven by oil sands development, downstream communities tried to muster opposition, but more often than not, their concerns were dismissed, whether at regulatory hearings or directly by the government.14
In late 1981, a tailings leak spilled into the Athabasca River at the same time as a malfunction occurred with Fort McKay’s water towers, purportedly temporary infrastructure that had been installed to deal with contamination of the regional water supply. Without other options, and not yet aware of the tailings spill, Fort McKay residents began to take water from the Athabasca, just as they had done prior to region’s industrialization. The contaminated river caused people to get ill, with “headaches, sores in the mouths, and other flu-like symptoms.” It was only at an unrelated GCOS meeting, approximately three months after the leak began, that community members were informed that the “Athabasca River water was ‘dangerous’ to drink.”15 Dorothy McDonald, Fort McKay’s Chief, took the company to court for its failure to contain and then disclose information about the leak, only to have the majority of the charges thrown out on a series of technicalities.16 Beginning from the late 1960s, a clear pattern had emerged: unreported tailings releases led to community illness and the companies whose infrastructure failed would face only minor repercussions (if any) for those failures.
Living with a “Dangerous” Athabasca River: The Need for Truth and Reconciliation
This pattern has continued to the present, with releases of tailings and oil into the Athabasca River by industrial developers remaining a common and likely under-reported occurrence.17 This reality has become ingrained in the knowledge systems of downstream Indigenous communities, which are experiencing increased cancer rates and other negative health impacts.18 Downstream Indigenous communities have ramped up their own monitoring programs, hired and trained environmental guardians, and attempted to hold both developers and governments accountable, with limited success. Leaks continue, and after they occur, they often remain hidden, sometimes for months, as was the case with the 2022 Imperial Kearl tailings release. The $50,000 fine eventually levied in 2024 by the Alberta Energy Regulator is dwarfed by the multi-billion dollar profit Imperial Kearl recorded over the period in which tailings were seeping into the Athabasca River.19
Tailings ponds continue to be one of the largest – if not the largest – burdens for oil sands developers and the Alberta and Canadian governments to manage. Their footprint currently takes up more than 300 square kilometers and, since 2005, the ponds have grown in size at a rate of 42 percent every five years.20 As they continue to grow, so do the liabilities facing government and industry.21 Indeed, the establishment of the CIWG and the millions spent on “technical reports” to address the tailings problem are a testament to the potential financial costs and ecological risks facing government and industry.22 There is reason to worry, however, that this effort and investment might be misplaced as it fails to account for the experiences and worldviews of downstream Indigenous communities who have had to adapt to living with an Athabasca River that has been made “dangerous.”
A more promising approach to the contamination problem must, first and foremost, accept as truth the communities’ lived experiences. Historical releases of contaminants have caused real health impacts to residents, effects ranging from immediate sickness to possible increased risk of rare cancers. While the federal government is beginning to recognize this reality by committing to fund community led health studies,23 they (with the provincial government and industry) must do more to acknowledge that, historically, they have not recognized the assertions made by communities. Furthermore, industry and government also need to accept that their communication strategies have themselves caused a great deal of suffering when community concerns have been dismissed as “panic.” The historical lack of response, in combination with deliberate efforts to downplay or ignore community fears, has created a circumstance in which community members are understandably sceptical of the prospect that companies regulated by government will ever be truthful or forthcoming. In many communities, this scepticism has become an adapted core belief, one that has been repeatedly validated by oil sands companies that reliably record massive profits even while degrading the local environment within existing regulatory systems.
If CWIG leaders are serious about incorporating insights from UNDRIP, RCAP and the TRC into their process, they would be wise to recognize that downstream Indigenous communities have been obliged to adapt to living with a dangerous river. Until that fact is recognized, it is unlikely that there will be anything close to reconciliation between affected communities on the one hand and government and industry on the other. Only with a common understanding of the impacts of tailings releases, one that builds on the knowledge and experiences of downstream communities, will it be possible to consider options to more effectively manage tailings along the Athabasca River.
Disclaimer: While author Peter Fortna has worked with many Indigenous communities along the Athabasca River, he does not represent any on the Crown Indigenous Working Group, and any errors in this post are his own, and likely a direct result of not spending enough time with knowledge holders on the land with a fresh cup of muskeg tea.
Feature image: Fort McKay on the Athabasca River circa 1975. Photo courtesy of Rod Hyde’s personal collection.
Notes
1. “Introduction to the Crown-Indigenous Working Group for the Potential Oil Sands Mining Effluent Regulations,” June 19, 2023, https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/managing-pollution/sources-industry/mining-effluent/oil-sands/crown-indigenous-working-group-engagement.html.
2. Oil Sands Mine Water Science Team, “Final Technical Reports and Commentary” (Alberta: Government of Alberta, December 5, 2024), https://open.alberta.ca/dataset/1802dfa1-8745-4f76-bc20-d16a6a3d04ff/resource/6a673c65-cbfa-4b24-a6bc-45dd1f4310dc/download/epa-osmwst-final-technical-reports-and-commentary.pdf.
3. Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Public Engagement on the Introduction to the Crown-Indigenous Working Group for the Potential Oil Sands Mining Effluent Regulations,” May 2, 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/managing-pollution/sources-industry/mining-effluent/oil-sands/summary-report-introduction-crown-indigenous-working-group.html. Some of these concerns are collected in the recently released news reporting and documentaries. See for example Nia Williams, “Focus: Canada Oil Sands Leak Heightens First Nations’ Calls to Clean up Tailings | Reuters,” Reuters, April 27, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/canada-oil-sands-leak-heightens-first-nations-calls-clean-up-tailings-2023-04-27/.; Brandi Morin, “For Indigenous Communities in ‘Alberta,’ the Oil Industry Has Left an Ugly Stain,” IndigiNews, December 7, 2023, https://indiginews.com/features/for-indigenous-communities-in-alberta-the-oil-industry-has-left-an-ugly-stain; Killer Water: The Toxic Legacy of Canada’s Oil Sands Industry for Indigenous Communities, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GRuV6eOqp6Q.
4. GCOS would be renamed Suncor early in 1982.
5. The Bechtel Company was the prime contractor for the construction of the Great Canadian Oil Sands Plant and later the Syncrude Operation on the Athabasca River. The company produced a promotional video about the project the same year as Grandjambe wrote her letter to the provincial government. Water pollution on the Athabasca was not mentioned in the video: ATHABASCA TAR SANDS / OIL SANDS 1967 BECHTEL CORP. PROMO FILM ALBERTA CANADA 10494, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D7CuoP6iOnc.
6. Theresa Grandjambe, “Re Water Quality,” February 16, 1967, GR1979.0152 Box 16 Item 217 – Fort McKay Community Files, Provincial Archives of Alberta, https://ucp.manifoldapp.org/system/resource/f/e/e/fee9ea04-ad87-46d9-8357-a750d58b34d1/attachment/ab9777935daf3dafa4c179475fa30d56.pdf.
7. L. Gareau, “Re: Fort McKay Water Problems,” July 6, 1967, GR1979.0152 Box 16 Item 217 – Fort McKay Community Files, Provincial Archives of Alberta, https://ucp.manifoldapp.org/system/resource/f/e/e/fee9ea04-ad87-46d9-8357-a750d58b34d1/attachment/ab9777935daf3dafa4c179475fa30d56.pdf., page 64-66.
8. To help understand Indigenous peoples relationship to the Athabasca River see: Craig Candler et al., “As Long as the Rivers Flow: Athabasca River Knowledge, Use and Change: Executive Summary” (Parkland Institute, November 26, 2010), https://acfn.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/As-the-River-Flows.pdf. Fort McKay Tribal Administration, “From Where We Stand: Traditional Land Use and Occupancy Study of the Fort McKay First Nation,” May 1983, https://ucp.manifoldapp.org/projects/9781773855936/resource/em-from-where-we-stand-traditional-land-use-and-occupancy-study-of-the-fort-mckay-first-nation-em-fort-mckay-tribal-administration-1983.
9. C.L. Pearson, “Re- Fort McKay Settlement,” May 31, 1973, GR1979.0152 box 16, item 217, Provincial Archives of Alberta, https://ucp.manifoldapp.org/system/resource/f/e/e/fee9ea04-ad87-46d9-8357-a750d58b34d1/attachment/ab9777935daf3dafa4c179475fa30d56.pdf.
10. Graeme Bethell, “Preliminary Inventory of the Environmental Issues and Concerns Affecting the People of Fort MacKay, Alberta,” May 1985.
11. See Hereward Longley, “Bitumen Extraction, Indigenous Land Conflicts, and Environmental Change in the Athabasca Oil Sands Region, 1963-1993” (PhD diss., Edmonton, University of Alberta, 2021), 153-157. https://doi.org/10.7939/r3-a9xb-rd56.
12. For example see: H.L. Hogge et al., “Alberta Government Committee Report on Great Canadian Oil Sands Oil Spill to Athabasca River, June 6, 1970,” August 12, 1970, https://dn720003.ca.archive.org/0/items/albertagovernmen00unse/albertagovernmen00unse.pdf; Canadian Press, “Government Knew GCOS Dumped Waste into the River,” Calgary Albertan, June 10, 1976, https://www.newspapers.com/article/the-calgary-albertan-1976-06-10-govern/167826445/; Hereward Longley also provides a detailed account of the various spills along the Athabasca River. See Hereward Longley, “Bitumen Extraction, Indigenous Land Conflicts, and Environmental Change in the Athabasca Oil Sands Region, 1963-1993” (Edmonton, University of Alberta, 2021), https://doi.org/10.7939/r3-a9xb-rd56.
13. “Notley Demands Public Probe into Athabasca Spill,” The Calgary Albertan, June 18, 1970, https://www.newspapers.com/image/729671622/; “Media Blamed for Panic” (Edmonton Journal, November 18, 1970); Richard Houghton, “GCOS- a Beaver in a Pond,” The Calgary Albertan, February 23, 1977, https://www.newspapers.com/image/729816798/.
14. Peter Fortna, Fort McKay Métis Nation: A Community History (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2025), https://ucp.manifoldapp.org/projects/9781773855936, esp. Chapter 5.
15. Graeme Bethell, “Preliminary Inventory of the Environmental Issues and Concerns Affecting the People of Fort MacKay, Alberta,” 39.
16. The details of the event are covered in Peter Fortna, Fort McKay Métis Nation: A Community History (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2025), https://ucp.manifoldapp.org/projects/9781773855936, p.113-115. Also see: Hereward Longley, “Bitumen Extraction, Indigenous Land Conflicts, and Environmental Change in the Athabasca Oil Sands Region, 1963-1993” (Edmonton, University of Alberta, 2021), https://doi.org/10.7939/r3-a9xb-rd56 esp. 312-321.
17. For example see: Kevin P. Timoney, “Regulatory Failure to Monitor and Manage the Impacts of Tailings Spills, Alberta, Canada,” Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 197, no. 2 (January 3, 2025): 125, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10661-024-13416-1. The history of such spills on the Athabasca River is covered at length in Hereward Longley, “Bitumen Extraction, Indigenous Land Conflicts, and Environmental Change in the Athabasca Oil Sands Region, 1963-1993.” esp. 153-157.
18. Yiqun Chen, “Cancer Incidence in Fort Chipewyan, Alberta 1995-2006” (Edmonton: Alberta Cancer Board, Division of Pouplation Health and Infomration Surveillance, February 2009). In August 2024, the federal government announced a commitment to complete a new health study in Fort Chipewyan led by the two First Nations and one Métis Nation which live in the community. Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Federal Government Announces Support for Community-Led Health Study in Athabasca Oil Sands Region,” news releases, August 7, 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/news/2024/08/federal-government-announces-support-for-community-led-health-study-in-athabasca-oil-sands-region.html.
19. Bob Weber, “Alberta Regulator Fines Imperial Oil over Kearl Tailings Pond Leaks,” CBC News, August 22, 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/alberta-energy-regulator-kearl-leak-1.7302069. Nia Williams and Vallari Srivastava, “Imperial Oil Posts 68% Jump in Q2 Profit on Higher Crude Prices, Production | Reuters,” August 2, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/imperial-oil-posts-higher-quarterly-profit-2024-08-02/.
20. Gillian Chow-Fraser and Alienor Rougeot, “50 YEARS of Sprawling Tailings: Mapping Decades of Destruction by Oil Sands Tailings,” 2022, https://cpawsnab.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/50YearsSprawlingTailings_WEB_ForDistribution.pdf.
21. Drew Yewchuk and Martin Olszynski, “The Liabilities Go Up and the Security Stays the Same: The Oilsands Mine Financial Security Program in 2024,” ABLAWG Blog, October 4, 2024, https://ablawg.ca/2024/10/04/the-liabilities-go-up-and-the-security-stays-the-same-the-oilsands-mine-financial-security-program-in-2024/.
22. In late 2024 the Alberta government released a series of reports with more than 3,500 pages regarding how oil sands processed water could be safely released into the Athabasca River. Oil Sands Mine Water Science Team, “Final Technical Reports and Commentary” (Alberta: Government of Alberta, December 5, 2024), https://open.alberta.ca/dataset/1802dfa1-8745-4f76-bc20-d16a6a3d04ff/resource/6a673c65-cbfa-4b24-a6bc-45dd1f4310dc/download/epa-osmwst-final-technical-reports-and-commentary.pdf.
23. Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Federal Government Announces Support for Community-Led Health Study in Athabasca Oil Sands Region,” news releases, August 7, 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/news/2024/08/federal-government-announces-support-for-community-led-health-study-in-athabasca-oil-sands-region.html; Vincent McDermott, “‘Truth Will Come out’: Feds Fund Study of Potential Oilsands Health Impacts on Fort Chipewyan,” Fort McMurray Today, August 7, 2024, https://www.fortmcmurraytoday.com/news/truth-will-come-out-feds-fund-study-of-potential-oilsands-health-impacts-on-fort-chipewyan.
